Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis by Baker, Jonathan
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
1997 
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis 
Jonathan Baker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Law and 
Economics Commons 
( (0 V 1 R • S 1' ) R I I- S
Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories
in Merger Analysis
by Jonathan B. Baker
nilateral theories of the
adverse competitive effect of
mergers have been growing in
significance over the past
decade at the federal antitrust enforce-
ment agencies. While this change is less
dramatic than antitrust's Chicago School
revolution, it too constitutes a paradigm
shift. This article reviews the rise of the
new perspective and describes in detail
all example based on an auction model
applied at the Federal Trade Commission
to analyze the Rile-Aid/Revco merger.'
Rise of Unilateral Theories
The 1992 )epartment of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines distinguish between
anticompetitive mergers that make it
more likely or more effective for firms to
coordinate their actions, and anticonipet-
ihive mergers that make it profitable for
the merging firms to ieduce outlput and
raise price tnilaterally. Unilateral theo-
ries are now by ar the most connon ii
the internal analyses of the antitrust
en forcement agencies, particularly
amiong agency economists.
This was not always the case. The first
Chicago School-era merger guidelines,
issued by the Justice )epalnent in 1982,
highlighted factors fiacilitating collusion
(§ Ill.C); thai discussion was the prede-
cessor to the current Gtfidelines' discus-
sion of coordinated com1petitive ef'ects.
Although the 1982 Guidelines also con-
Jonathan B. Baker is l)irector, Bunareatn o
Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
The views ex Tressed are not necessarilv
those of the Federal Trade Commission or
any individual Commissioner The author
thanks Robert G. Hansen, Gay Roberts,
and Robert D. Willig. This article revises
and extends the author's remarks present-
ed to the ABA Antitrust Section Annual
Meeting, Orlando, Fla. (Aug. 6, 1996).
taned a "leading firm proviso" that dealt
with the creation or enhancement of the
market power of a dominant firm (§
III.A.2), the application of this unilateral
theory of' potential adverse competitive
effects of mergers was very narrow. As
late as 1986, the leading survey of antitrust
policy issues raised by horizontal mergers
essentially ignored unilateral theories.'
Two developments in economics have
brought unilateral theories to the fore.
The first was a theoretical literature, ini-
tiated by Salant. Switzer and Reynolds,
that investigated tie conditions under
which oligopolists would find merger
profitable even if the industry members
were not coordinating their actions.' The
second was an empirical literature
encouraged by the simullaneous devel-
opinent of' new econometric tools and
computerized point-of-sale scanner data
(recording individual transactions at
supermarkets and other retail ouitlets).
These tools and data made it possible to
identify in many cases the extent to which
coIsuLers consider individual products
close substilutes tihe extent to which, in
consequence, individual products con-
strain the pricing of rivals; and the extent
to which mergers encourage higher prices
by removing those constraints.'
The 1992 lorizontal Merger Guide-
lines recognize these economic develop-
nments by setting forth several ways in
which mergers may "lesslenJ competi-
tion through unilateral effccts" (§ 2.2).
The settings in which this may occur
include two in which competition is
Ioca lizIed-a spatial Iocat ion model of
competition among sellers of differenti-
tiled producls (§ 2.2 1 ) and an auction
model variant (§ 2.21 n.21 ) --and a third
in which firms sell homogeneous prod-
ucts and are distinguished prinarily by
their capacities (§ 2.22). The localized
competition theory of competitive ef fects
of mergers aiong sellers of di fferentiat-
ed products may be the most familiar,
because it is usually the basis for the
analysis of mergers among sellers of
branded consumer products. (See box.)
Mergers in an Auction Model
The Rite Aid/Revco merger illustrates
one tnilateral theory of adverse compel-
itive effects from merger, an auction
model that may be thought of as a, variant
of the homogeneous product story told in
the 1992 Merger Guidelines. The auc-
lion setting highlights the possibility that
firms selling indivisible goods, and
unable to expand otntptil because of
capacity constraints, mlay be able to
induce price increases by making "all-or-
nothing" offers-a possibility not noted
in the 1992 Guidelines.
One way to tell the story is with a
numerical example." The example
assumes that the goods are indivisible and
that selling firms are capacity con-
strained, forcing a buyer to purchase from
multiple sellers. it one seller gains control
over what had been two sellers' resources,
the Inerged firnl may be able to engineer
a higher price by making the buyer aii
all-or-nothing offer for the output of its
now-larger capacity. The reason is that if'
the buiyer were to reject the all-or-nothing
of'f'er, it might find it necessary to go
deeper into its list of allernative suippliers
to replace the merged firm. If the buyer's
alternatives grow less attractive because
of differences among sellers (seller het-
erogeneity), the seller's bargaining lever-
age is enhanced a1d a higher price may
resull.
Int particuilar, consider a market with
ten sellers, where each produces exactly
one unit. The goods are indivisible:
a seller cannot prodtucc a partial unit. This
assutlpion is oflten reasonable: it is typ-
ically hard to sell part of a hospitl 1 or
part of a brand name, for examp e.'
Becau se the selling firm s are capacity
constrained, an individual buyer seeking
multiple units intisi purchase from in tilt i-
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pie sellers. All 1hrn1s' products are identi-
cal, but the sellers differ-in the example,
they have different production costs.X The
first seller produces its unit at a marginal
cost of one, tile second seller at a mar-
ginal cost of two, and so forth, so tile
tenth seller has a cost of ten.
Now suppose that a buyer needs seven
units of the good, but has little or no use
for more." The buyer asks all sellers to bid
to supply any or all of the seven units it
needs, and pays the same price to all sell-
ers whose bid it accepts.' In the most
plausible auction models," the buyer will
purchase one unit 1rem each of the first
seven firms, which are the lowest cost
suppliers, and pay a price of eight (or.just
under) for each unit. No seller can induce
the buyer to pay more than eight, because
the buyer has the option of turning to the
eighth firm, which is just willing to pro-
duce and sell for a price of' eight.'" The
total paid by the buyer is 56.
'Fle potential for firmis to engineer a
price rise by making an all-or-nothing
offer is demonstrated when any two of
the seven lowest-cost sellers merge. To
make the examlple concrete, assume that
tie merger involves the first two sellers,
which happen to be the two lowest cost
producers. After the merger, the coi-
bined one/two firm offers the buyer two
units at a price of' just under) eighteen for
the package. This is equivalent to
demanding that the buyer acquire two
units and pay a price (just under) nine for
each. The buyer's best option for piu-
chasing the seven units it needs is to
accept that offer and obtain the other five
units it requires from firms three through
seven. The buyer obtains the seven units
it demands from the seven lowest cost
sellers, which include the merged firm,
and pays a price of (just under) nine for
each. As all sellers receive the higher
price, the per unit price rises from eight to
nine and the total paid by the buyer
increases from 56 to 63.
The reason the price goes up is that the
buyer's alternatives, if it refuses an all-or-
nothing offer from the merged firm, are
less attractive then they were before the
merger." After the merger, if the buyer
turns down the all-or-nothing offer from
the combined firms one and two, it call no
longer merely turn to a seller with a cost
of eight; tie buyer's best alternative is
now to buy from both the eighth and ninth
firms. Because one of these producers has
a cost of nine, the buyer would have to
pay aI price of' nine to every seller.'
Accordingly, the merged firm can extract
a per unit price of (just under) nine
through an all-or-nothing offer to the
buyer.
Two features of this example are criti-
cal to generating the price increase. First,
the available units exceed what the buyer
needs. In consequetIce, what the firms
produce are substitutes to the buyer,'
making the transaction a horizontal merg-
er among the sellers of substitutes.
Second, the ninth firm's output is less
attractive to the buyer than the eighth
firm's; in the example, it costs tuore to
produce. This makes the buyer's alterna-
tives worse when the merged firm makes
al all-or-nothing offer, compared to the
buyer's alternatives to dealing with the
first firm before the merger. If instead, f'or
example, the ninth firm were idetitical to
the eighth firm and could also produce at
a cost of eight, the merged firm could not
induce the buyer to sell to it at a price
above eight by making an all-or-nothing
oI'fer. 1
In the numerical example-clracter-
ized by product indivisibilities, seller
capacity constraints, and a rigid buyer
"need" requirement-the surplus that the
seller extracts through all-or-nothing offer
is a pure transfer from the buyer. In set-
tings where the seller has some ability to
restrict output or lower quality, and the
buyer has somne ability to reduce its pur-
chases in response to a price increase,
however, the merger could also be expect-
ed to generate an efficiency loss. On the
other hand, if' the merged firm can credi-
bly make all-or-nothing offers, it may
also be able to expand output through vol-
Lime discoutIts, multipart pricing, or other
complex pricing schemes, and thereby
potentially create an eficiency gain to
weigh against that efficiency loss.
As with other unilateral theories of
adverse competitive effect from the merg-
er of firnls selling demand substitutes, this
story shows how the loss of' seller coin-
petition makes a buyer's best alternative
to dealing with a seller less attractive.
leading the buyer to pay a higher price.
The novelty here comes from marrying
product indivisibilities and seller capaci-
ty constraints with the auction modlC. Inl
the auction molel imentioned in the
Merger Guidelines, only mergers involv-
ing the marginal excluded firim1, firm eight
in the example, would raise price by mak-
ing buyer's alternatives less attractive.
Here, in contrast, mergers allong infra-
marginal sellers, such as firms one and
two, can create market power.
The Rite Aid/Revco Merger
This theory helps explain why tile Rite
Aid/Revco merger appeared to create a
competitive problem. The merger
involved two large operators of retail
pharmacies in the United States, each
with a substantial market share in nuner-
ous metropolitan areas. The Federal
Trade Commission was concerned that
the combined firm would be able to exer-
cise market power in the sale of retail
pharmacy services to managed care
providers offering pharmacy benefits and
to their enrollees. Previous drug store
mergers investigated by the Commission
had not involved consolidations of this
scope and had inot f'ound problems in the
sale of' pharmacy services to managed
care: the earlier investigations had uncov-
ered a potential for raising drug prescrip-
tion prices to cash customers only.
The competitive problem can be
shown through a hypothetical example
involving a Blue Cross plan that seeks to
put together a pharmacy network in a
major metropolitan area. Blue Cross
needs to contract with a pharmacy net-
work in order to provide drug benefits to
those covered by its health care plan. It
wants to market the health plan to major
employers in the local area, and needs to
tell plan enrollees what pharmacies they
can go to in order to fill their prescription.
Blue Cross must pay the pharmacies by
the prescription to perfloriim that service.
Bioth Blue Cross and the pharmacies
see a tradeoff' between a large network
and a small one. This iradeoffl is f'unda-
mentally between convenience and price.
A large network, containing most of' the
pharlacies in town, Will allow virtually
ill plan enrollees--individual con-
Sulers-to obtain i their prescriltionis at a
convenient location. This makes the plan
attractive to enrollees and employers and,
f'or that reason, profltable f'or Blue Cross
and the pharmacies in its net\woil . But a
sinall network, one containing only a
fraction of the pharmacies in the metro-
politan area, gives each member ph'irma-
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Mergers Among Sellers of
Differentiated Products
T he localized competition theory of competitive effects of merg-
ers among sellers of differentiated products set forth in the
1992 Merger Guidelines (§ 2.21) is perhaps the most com-
monly employed unilateral story. To illustrate it, consider a
merger in a hypothetical breakfast cereal industry. Suppose the Crunchy
Cereal Co., which makes the Crunchies brand, seeks to acquire the Fruity
Cereal Co., maker of Fruities. To simplify the example suppose, at vari-
ance with the real breakfast cereal industry, that each firms sells only one
brand and that firms promote their brands exclusively through national
advertising (and not by discounting prices at supermarkets).
Before the merger, Crunchies sells for $2.00 per standard-sized box.
Once the fixed costs of manufacturing, distribution, and advertising are
accounted for, an additional cereal box costs $1.10 to produce and sell.
If the price were to rise to $2.10, suppose further, Crunchies would lose
10 out of every 100 unit sales.' Quantity sold declines because some cus-
tomers buy fewer Crunchies than before, some substitute other breakfast
cereals, and some do without cereal altogether.
With these assumptions, the manufacturer would not be able to
Increase profits by raising the Crunchies price. In making that determi-
nation, the company balances the cost of lost sales against the gain
from higher price-cost margins. On the cost side, the company loses a
contribution margin (price less marginal cost) of $0.90 on 10 out of every
100 premerger purchases, for a total loss of $9.00. Against that loss,
Crunchies would gain an additional $0.10 profit on the 90 out of every
100 purchases it keeps, for a gain of $9.00 per 100 units sold premerg-
er. Because the gain from raising price ($9.00) does not exceed the cost
(also $9.00), the firm does not increase its price.'
The merger can alter this calculus, making profitable an increase in
the Crunchies price. Of the 10 unit sales out of every 100 lost were the
Crunchies price to rise to $2.10, suppose that 3 would go to Fruities.3 For
those customers, Fruities is the closest substitute for Crunchies at cur-
rent prices. Suppose further that the price of Fruities is $0.80 more than
the marginal cost of producing more. (For example, Fruities may sell for
$2.10 and cost $1.30.) If Crunchies acquires Fruities before raising price
to $2.10, Crunchies gains the benefit of diverting some Crunchies sales
to another brand, Fruities, that it now also owns. On the 3 out of every
100 Crunchies units sold premerger that become Fruities sales, the
merged firm earns a profit of $0.80 per unit, for a total gain of $2.40 per
100 Crunchies units sold premerger. Accordingly, it is now profitable to
increase the Crunchles price to $2.10.
Why does the merged firm want to increase the price of Crunchies?
Before the merger, the Crunchies price was held in check by the collec-
tive presence of competition from those rival brands, including Fruities,
that were the second choice for a significant fraction of consumers. But
with the merger, Crunchies no longer is concerned about the diversion
of some buyers to Fruities. Thus, the merger removes Fruities as a con-
straint on Crunchies pricing. For similar reasons, the merger may also
give the merged firm an incentive to increase the price of Fruities.
The example also suggests the importance of product repositioning
as a force tending to undercut the profitability of a post-merger price
increase. Oaties may respond to the Crunchies price rise by adding
Crunchy Oaties and Fruity Oaties to its product line, or by stepping up
promotion of those brand extensions if they already exist.' As a result,
more than 10 out of 100 Crunchies customers could switch away in
response to a Crunchies price increase, and most of the switchers who
formerly saw Fruities as their second choice may choose an Oaties prod-
uct instead. If so, it may no longer be profitable to increase the price of
Crunchies after the merger.
Efficiencies from the merger may also counteract the incentive to raise
price. For example, Crunchies and Fruities together may be able to
achieve substantial scale economies in promotion and distribution. If the
marginal cost of producing Crunchies were to decline sufficiently, the
post-merger price could fall notwithstanding the loss of direct competi-
tion between the two brands.
The example also helps clarify the way econometric estimates of
demand elasticities relate to this competitive effects theory. Econometric
studies in effect offer a way of determining the two most critical numbers
in the example: the fraction of customers (10 out of 100) who would no
longer purchase Crunchies were the price to rise a small amount, and the
fraction of those (3 out of 10) who would switch to Fruities.5 With the
addition of accounting estimates of the price and marginal cost of
Crunchies and the price-cost margin for Fruities, the methodology of the
example could be applied to determine the profitability of a small Increase
in the price of Crunchies. That profit increase (in the example, 1.2% of
premerger revenues) provides one indicator of the strength of incentives
to raise the price of Crunchies.
Simulation methods take one step more: they compute the profitabil-
ity of all possible price changes for both Crunchies and Fruities (simul-
taneously), and identify which is the most profitable.' The resulting pro-
jected post-merger prices provide an alternative indicator of the strength
of incentives to increase price that takes into account the interrelationship
between the demand for the two products. To make such computations,
it is necessary to estimate how the fraction of customers who would no
longer purchase Crunchies, and the share of those who would switch to
Fruities, changes with different potential price Increases (such as a rise
in the Crunchies price to $2.20 or $2.40 as well as to $2.10). This
amounts to estimating how the own- and cross-price demand elasticities
change with movements along the demand functions. In addition, this
computation requires information about the way marginal cost varies
with changes in output, and information about the way the sellers of
other brands will react to price increases by the merged firm.*
Jonathan B. Baker
'If a 5% increase in price Induces a 10% reduction in the quantity sold, the own price
elasticity of demand Is -2.
2 Nothing of consequence in the example would change were the variable costs of pro-
duction $1.099 per box, so that the price of $2.00 is strictly more profitable than the
price of $2.10.
'The Crunchies-Fruities merger can lead to a price rise regardless of the branrd cho-
sen by the remaining 7 out of every 100 Crunchies customers who stop purchasing
Crunchies but do not divert to Fruities. All 7 may switch to Oaties, or 2 may pick Oaties
and the rest divert to other breakfast foods; the competitive effects analysis would not
change.
The 1992 Merger Guidelines (§2.212 n.23) test the timeliness and likelihood of repo-
sitioning responses with the same methodology as is used in analyzing entry.
The first number is related to the own elasticity of demand for Crunchies, and the sec-
ond is related to the cross-elasticity of demand between the merging brands. Carl
Shapiro has termed the second fraction a "diversion ratio." Carl Shapiro, Mergets3th
Differentiated Products, ANIRUST, Spring 1996, at 23.
See generally Gregory J. Werden, Simulating Unilateral Competitive Effects from
Differentiated Products Mergers, infra this issue at 27; Jonathan B. Baker,
Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 GEo. MASON L. REV (lorthcoming 1997).
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cy inore business. In exchange for that
beietit, the pharnmacy may he willing to
accept a lower per-prescription payment
froii Blue Cross, thereby reducing Blue
Cross's costs and allowing Blue Cross to
lower the price of the drug benefits plan
to employers and enrollees.
In the hypothetical drug plan exam-
pie, Blue Cross has found that most
employers, looking at the price reduc-
tions made possible by reducing the
scope of pharmacy networks, resolve the
tradeoff largely in favor of con'enience.
Accordingly, Blue Cross believes it must
include, let us say, at least 60 percent of
tile drug stores in town, distributed across
all neighbori.,ods, in order to offer a drug
plan it can saccessfully market to
employers.'' All pharmacy counters are
not equally attractive to Blue Cross, how-
ever. On average, Blue Cross prefers
pharmacy counters located in stores that
are part of a large chain over pharnmacies
ill small chains, and it prefers chain store
pharnlitcics 1t independents. 2' Soie 0f
the independent stores may be as attrac-
tive to Blue Cross as somie of the chain
stores, but many of the independent stores
are unattractive.
Blue Cross effectively conducts an
auction, seeking bids from pharnacies
for the payment they would require to
join Blue Cross's network. The setting
reasonably tracks the auction tiodel we
have been discussing. Al individual drug
store is limited to a single location, thus
creating both an indivisibility and the
equivalent of a capacity constraint front
the point of view of Blue Cross seeking to
put together a network of pharmacies at
multiple locations. Seller heterogeneity
creates the equivalent 0f marginal cost
variation across pharniacy counters: chain
store pharmacies tend to be like tile low
cost sellers in the nunierical example by
virtue of their greater attractiveness to
Blue Cross, where cost is conceived of in
ternis of providing retail pharmacy ser-
qj Section
Can you answer these antitrust-related questions?
* Would this situation violate 15 U.S.C. S 13(a)? I buy a product for
$100. I resell the product for $75. I make up the difference by dis-
playing advertisements in my catalogue.
* Where can I get a complete copy of the complaint and the consent
decree originally entered In the Meat Packers Litigation in 1920?
* What Is the quick look or truncated rule of reason? When do we
apply it? When a practice Is "Inherently suspect?" What does that
mean? When Is it apparently a naked restraint? What does that
mean?
For the answers to these and other questions and the opportunity to
ask your own questions and participate in fast-paced discussions on
current antitrust Issues, subscribe to the Antitrust Section
Discussion group at-members.
To subscribe, send an e-mail message to Ilstserver@abanet.org and
in the text of the message type:
subscribe at-members "your e-mail address"
Be sure to omit the quotes in the actual message.
Any questions? Contact Bob Joseph, discussion group
moderator, at rtj@sonnenschein.com
vices to Blue Cross at a given level of
quality.
B3lue Cross does not negotiate with
pharmacy chains bOr store-by-store par-
ticipation in its pharnmacy network; it
negotiates chain-by-chain. So suppose,
again hypothetically, that in somn metro-
politan area Rite Aid accounts for 25 per-
cent of the pharmiacy counters and Revco
accounts for 10 percent. Eight other
chains each control 5 percent of the phiar-
niacy counters, and the reniaining 25 per-
cent are found in individuallly owned
stores.-'
Blue Cross's ability to negotiate a low
price with Rite Aid turns on the nature of
its alternatives. Before the merger, when
Blue Cross informally seeks bids fromn
drug store chains to join its network, it
views Rite Aid as minking an all-or-noth-
ing offer for 25 percent of the pharmacy
counters in town. Without Rite Aid, it
could put together a network with 60 per-
cent coverage by contracting with Revco.
the eight small chains, and sonie of the
better independetits. It tCeds less than
half the independents to to soi. After the
merger, Rite Aid would nake an all-or-
nothing offer involving 35 percent of the
area's pharmacy counters. Blue Cross's
alternatives for doing without Rite Aid
would theni be significantly worse; to
avoid dealing with the merged firn. Blue
Cross Must go deeper into the group 0if
sellers it would previously have rejected.
To reach 60 percent coverage without
Rite Aid, it must include most of the inde-
pendent pharmacies, including some of
tile least attractive ones. Recognizing this,
Rite Aid cati successfully hold out for a
higher price than it would have received
before the Iiierger, and the price 13ue
Cross must pay rises.
This is not a theory thai autoniltically
makes any drug chain nierger illegal.
Some of the counter-argunlcints Rite Aid
mighl make, assuming factual support.
would apply to prltect any merger froni
antitrust challenge by government
enforcers, regardless of the competitive
effects theory. These include proof that
post-ierger concentration is within
Merger Guidelines safe harbors based on
market shares, that entry woul d olve tile
4 .
competitive problem,: that eli iciencies
would lead the merged firmn not to raise
price, or that efficiency benefits from the
deal outweigh any hari toi competition.
2 4 I A 1 II R I I% I
C 0 V 1: R S 1 ( R I 1E S
Other possible arguments for tile par-
ties come from the framework of the auc-
tion nodel. " The parties inight demon-
strate that Blue Cross's alternatives do
not get worse following this merger. For
example, they might show that most of
the independent pharmacies are about as
attractive to Blue Cross as tile small
chains. If so, the merged tirm could not
obtain more bargaining leverage in deal-
ing with Blue Cross by framing a larger
all-or-nothing offer than Rite Aid had
made premerger.24
Or the parties might demonstrate that
ill response to the anticompetitive poten-
tial of this merger, enough of the least
attractive independents would find it
worthwhile to make themselves more
desirable to Blue Cross-and thus prove
that repositioning by non-party rivals
would solve the competitive problem.
Or the parties might show, contrary to
what tie hypothetical example assumed,
that Blue Cross and its enrollees find a
network with 60 percent coverage equal-
ly attractive as a network with, let us say,
30 percent coverage (after consideration
of the lower price fbr prescription drugs
that a smaller network could make possi-
ble). 21 If so, Blue Cross's alternatives to
dealing with Rite Aid do not get worse
with the merger. Blue Cross retains the
post-merger alternative of putting togeth-
er a smaller network composed only of
chain stores, all fron the smaller chains,
without need for including any of the
unattractive independents.
The model of auctions with product
indivisibilities and capacity constraints
does not apply only to pharmacies. For
example, it may explain why a cable tele-
vision programming merger placing a
leading news channel under connon
ownership with a leading movie channel
could raise tile price of programming to
cable systera operators2"-even it most
viewers do not consider the two channels
to be substitutes.
27
Suppose there are ten "narquee" cable
networks, and a cable system needs to
carry at least seven out of the ten in order
to attract a significant number of sub-
scribers. Then the marquee networks
would be substitutes in filling the cable
system's "nust have" slots. But some
marquee networks may be more attractive
to tie cable system than others. Then an
all-or-nothing offer including two or
more relatively attractive networks, made
credible by merger, may permit the pro-
grammer to extract a higher price fron
the cable system operator by making the
cable system's alternatives to dealing
with those networks worse than they were
before tile merger.2'
The Role of Market Definition
In the auction example, the market was
not highly concentrated, yet a small
increase in concentration led to a sub-
stantial price increase."' The price rose
substantially because the buyer did not
have a good alternative to accepting the
merged firm's all-or-nothing offer. The
merged firm's negotiating leverage
depended upon the attractiveness of the
buyer's next best alternative premerger,
relative to the next best alternative after
the merger, not upon concentration in the
market as a whole. Similarly, small
increases in concentration call generate
higher prices in the localized conpetition
model of mergers aniong sellers of dif-
ferentiated products (see box). The rea-
son: two brands may be close substitutes
even if both have low market shares.
In short, market shares may not cap-
lure all the factors relevant to assessing
unilaieral incentives to raise price fol-
lowing merger. Under such circum-
stances, concentration measures may per-
form poorly in identifying tie mergers
most likely to harm competition.
To the extent these unilateral theories
are best demonstrated though evidence
other than market concentration and its
increase, market definition has limited
importance in analyzing a merger.
Indeed, if the likely harm to competition
is shown with evidence not invilving
market shares, there is little need to spec-
ify the precise boundaries of the market
within which that harm will occur.''
Yet, even when market shares are not
strongly probative, merger analysis will
depend upon identifying the sellers of
close substitutes. The auction example
presumed knowledge of the identity of
the rival bidders and their relative attrac-
tiveness. Similarly, econometric methods
of estimating the fraction of the acquiring
firm's customers that see the acquired
firm's products as their second choice-
a critical input for determining the
strength of post-nierger incentives to raise
price-may produce erroneous results if
soiie close substitutes are onitted from
the analysis. Accordingly, one outcome of
the market definition process, the identi-
ty of the sellers of close substitutes,
remains important even when another
outcome, market shares, contributes little
to merger analysis.,
[7TC Will Seek to Block Rite Aid/Re'o Mert'er, 1TC News, Apr. 17, 1996;
Rite Aid Abantons Proosed Acquisition of Retco After FTC Sought to
Block Transaction, FTC News, Apr. 24, 1996.
'See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGcRAitn No. 12, HORIZONTAl.
MERGiRS: LAW AND PoLicY 254 n. 1300 (1986).
Stephen W. Salant el al., lasses.fi'occ Horizontal Merger: Th E fcts of
ailc Exog enots Change ill IndustriY St'uctilre oin Coi rnot- Nash
Equilibriwn, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 185 (1983). Later contributions include
Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, hIcentives to F--orm Coalitions
with Bertrand Comnetition, 16 RAND J. EcON. 473 (1985); Martin K.
Perry & Robert H. Porter, Oligojoly and file Incentive jor Ilorizontal
Aerger, 75 Am. EcON. Ri~v. 219 (1985); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro,
Hlorizontal Alergers: An Equilibriumn Analysis, 80 ANt. ECON. Riv. 107
(1990).
E.g., Jonathan B. Baker & rimothy F Bresnahian, The Gains froin Aerger
or Collusion in Prodcutc-I)iffreitiated hiduhstries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON.
427 (1985): Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, Some Applications and
Limitations of Recent Advances inc Enpirical huhistrial Organization:
MergerAnaly"sis, 83 Am. ECON. RiEv. 247 (Papers & Proceedings May
1993); Jerry Hausnan et al., Comntitive Analysis with Diffi-rentiated
Pmducts, 34 ANNALi-S I'EcoNONIL I1E' DE- SrAISTIQUi- 159 (1994);
Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, 7/, Eftects of Aergers inl
Diffirentiated Products Ihhistries: Logit Demnd an d Aterger Policy. It0
J.L., ECON. & ORG. 407 (1994). Some issues arising in the application
of econometric tools to merger analysis are discussed in Jonathan B.
Baker, Conteg/ono r Enifirical Merger Analysis, 5 Gt:o. MAsoN. L.
Ri:'. (fo thcoming 1997).
rhe most closely related theoretical analysis may be Justice Department
economist Gregory Visnes's examination of how an alliance among ml-
tiple hospitals within the same market can profitably raise prices charged
health insurers. Gregory Vistes, Strategic Alliances and Multi-Firm
Systems (Oct. 1995) (unpublished manuscript). Deneckere & Davidson,
sittra note 3, and Perry & Porter, stupra note 3, had previously highlighted
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the imponance of constraints oil the ability of non-nierging rivals to expand,
such as capacity constraints or product differentiation, in naking it prof-
itable Ior merging firms to reduce output and raise price utilaterally.
"This example was created by Professor Robert Hansen of 1)artnout l's
Anos Tuck School of Business AdrItinistration.
l i some cases quality reduction could he understood as a fornt o" doing
so, however.
The analysis would be silnilat if the products cost the same to produce, but
differed in attractiveness to the buyer. Then, frotn tile point of view of the
buyer, the quality-adjusted cost would effectively vary in a way similar to
what is postulated in the exaunple in the text. Under either interpretation.
the model combines product homogeneity with differences aniong sellers
that lead to differences in their costs of providing the product to any given
buyer.
"The buyer needs 7 units in the sense oflhavi ng a very high willingness to
pay for each. Matters would not change much if* buyer would be willing,
to buy more than 7 units so long as tile price is no higher than that charged
for the first seven.
Altlhough the setting is an auction, it difters from the auction model nei-
tioned it tihe Merger Guidelines because the products are homogeneous
and each seller's capacity is contstraiined. The example assumes that the
auction is "Siutl taneous"' rather thai sequeintial. that sellers' costs are pith-
lic information, and that all sellers receive the identical price per unit.
These assumptions highlight the logic ollthe theory. Similar results woti ld
likely obtain if the auction is sequential, sellers' costs are pi'ivate, or buy-
ers cart pay sellers' discrimtinatory prices. The example also assumes that
the auction is ttot repeated.
This result would arise, for examtple, ii a sealed-bid, secotid-price model.
: None of the low cost sellers can extract tmore front tile buyer (nor divert
to itself any of the payments buyers make to other sellers) by anmtouncinrg
that unless the buyer pays it more than eight, it will not join the auction.
Prenierger, such l anioutcellnent would ttutt be credible itt the postulat-
ed auction settintg.
Before the merger, each seller made ani all-or-nothing offer to the buyer Ibr
its sole indivisible unit iii a nontrivial sense. That is. the tmerger could gen-
crate a price increase if capacity-constrained sellers capable of producitig
mu lliple utits mitake all-or-itothing offers pretterger-i f the sellers cred-
ibly present buyers with a supply schedule giving a price for various coin-
binations of units sold-and if' tle tilerged firm can make a larger all -or-
nothing offer than could any firm pretierger.
"If the buyer were to conduct an auctioni atnotig the renaining firms (3
through 10) to buy tile 7 units it needs, ignoring tile merged firn rather
than using the alternative of buying from firms 8 and 9 to limit the bar-
gaitning leverage of the tnerged firn, the buyer would pay ai even higher
price per unit, of 10.
Ihi tile example. the merged firm would not find it profitable to raise price
unless it can forbid the buyer fron choosing to purchase one, btilt iot twoi
units, from it. The reason is that the merged seller would lose more front
not selling the second unit that it would gaiti by raising price ott the unit
it does sell. Were tile merging firns instead high cost sellers, so thai the
forgone contribution margin ott the unit tot sold is smtall, it could be prof-
itable for tile merged firn to perntit the buyer to purchase only one uit,
though tot is profitable as insistirg otil tit all-or-nothitg offer.
'+ Once tile buyer has chosen its first 6 suppliers, all remiaining suppliers are
cttpeting to sell the seventh unit the buyer requires. If the buyer needed
all 10ii units available iii the market, tile outlput of the sellers would be coni-
pletnetits rather than substitutes fron tihe perspective of the buyer.
"The steeper the slope of tile supply curve the buyer faces in the teigh-
borhood of the ntumber of units it needs-a possible consequence of scll-
er helerogetteity-the greater the price increase likely to result trout a
giveu nerger.
If the Blue Cross plai attracts more enrollees, each pharmacy it tie net-
work will be able to fill more prescriptions. Not only that, people walk-
ing into the drug store to fill prescriptions tenid to buy other products.
Ilealth plais generally do not insist oi exclusivily, So tile pharmacies
would not be torced to drop other networks i,1 order to participate itt Blue
Cross's netvork.
Nothing significatt in tie story changes if', afier making a deal with 60,g
of the stores. Ble Cross takes ott ainy other pharmtacies that choose to joit
tile ,tetwork oi tile same termts. When a stock exchanige specialist "cleans
tip the book,' it effectively conducts art auctiort in ; siinilar way.
-"Chaiu stores tend to have features that ,ttake theit attractive to con-
sinners-better service, broader merchandise stock, lower prices, coive-
nient location, better parking, anid the likC-and thus make tlhem attractive
to Blue Cross. Chait stores also tend to have features that make them
attractive to Blue Cross directly, such as comrputerized drug inventory
managemllent.
-1 All the stores of any given level if" attractivettess to Blue Cross-s hether
large chain stores, smtiall chaih stores, the better independents, or the less
desirable stand-alonte stores-are distributed throughoutt the area in rough-
ly the way the popitlalio, is distributed. This assuillption, and the assutnp-
tiot1 that each plharnnacy coutnter is capable ol filling any prescription, ntake
outlet counts i reasonable ,teasure of competitisve significance itt the
hypothetical exnample.
For examiple, in response to this itterger Blie ('ross night encourage a
group of' good indepenident stores to affiliate with a pharmacy chaitn tiot
presently serving the tetropolitan area. Wilh Blie Cross's pharanlacy
business assured, motreover. the new chaii might find it attractise to open
additiontal stores.
:1 Rite Aid might also highlight drug chaii uncetainty about rival chain bids
to Blfe Cross. Such unLcertainty probably reduces the comtpetitive harm
from merger without eliinitiating it, however.
li terms of tie nuterical auction example set forth above, this is like
demnonstrating that the eighth and ninth tfirs both have costs of 8.
In leiills of the auctiotn example set forth above, it is as if the govertnment
clainis that Blue Cross needs 7 units while Rite Aid iisists thai Blue
Cross needs only 3 units. If health plan enrollees are ,tot iudiffereit, but
prefer the network with 607c, coverage (as the hypotlthetical example pre-
sumed), arnd if Blue Cross responds to the merger by shrinking its network
to 3147 coverage in order to keep drug prices from rising. that response
would reduce enrollee convenietce without lowerirg price, and thus con-
stitute hari to cottmpetition. The possibility that Blue Cross itight seek to
evade anticompetitive price inicreases in retail tiarkets for prescription
drugs by substituting a mail order ttetwork Ior a retail tetwork with 607/
coserage would be analyzed similarly.
1" See FTC Requires Restructurinug ofTin, 1ntrTu'r/Thrier Deal, Settleentt,
Resolves Charges that Deal Muld Reduce C'ale hIhistoi 'v Competition.
FTC News, Sept. 12, 1996; FTC Gi'es Final Aploval to ime lWo'ner/
Turner Deal, FTC News, Feb. 7, 1997.
27 Robert Willig has suggested another way a news channel and a movie
channel could be substitutes from tile perspective of tile cable system
operator esent if they are not substitutes to most 'iewers: if the sane
group of viewers happen to find both chaninels very attractive, the two
channels itight then be alternatives lor intducing those viewers to become
cable systeti subscribers.
2' The mtovie channel and news chaiiel need not f ornally tie their products
in order to make ai all-or-nothiig offer by the ,ierged firm credible. Even
if the two channrels cotiiue to be priced independently and muarkeled
through separate sales forces, their inrdepetdent regotiatiunis w iti a cable
system operator wvill have the effect of till all-or-nothing offer if each
chantnel offers tougher tenis to those cable systems that do not carry the
afiliated charnel. And to the extent cable systems that lose marquee net-
works lose subscribers, that result could be accomfplished without
acknowledging the int f'ornial tie through a price schedule giving discounts
to caile systemns with high market penetration.
Ili the exanmple, a merger creati,,g aIi firi owning 2W4 of the ,narket. and
inicreasing the 1111 fron IO0) to 1200, led to a price itncrease of' 12.5(.
1For a, discussioi of' how to harimtoiize this observation with tihe language
of' Clayton Act § 7, which mtany read to require a court tl identitfy tle prod-
Lct and geographic tntarket witlhii which comnpetitioi would be, Ipred. see
generally Jonalhai B. Baker, Prodict Difli'remtiation 7"1imttgf'pact anid
7itne: Some Attitrst Polioc '1Vts.n, AN I't i 1ST Bit .I.. ( forthcominig 1997).
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